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This paper uses a very large sample of French SMEs to study growth of small businesses. 
Firms are distinguished according to the intensity of family control. The estimated 
relationship accounts for firm characteristics of size, age, sector, and ease to access credit. 
The results show that firms with greater family control are prone to exhibit lower rates of 
sales growth than feasible, given firm internal financing resources  (ie they adopt a 
conservative growth behavior). Because firm growth is limited not by financing constraints 
but by family-related incentives to restrict firm size, increasing firm growth requires policies 
that shape incentives orientated toward growth in small family businesses.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The  European Union links its small and medium enterprise (SME) policy to broader 
objectives: the Lisbon process emphasizes the role that SMEs play in innovation, employment 
and dynamism of European economies. Policies supporting SME’s growth are orientated 
toward improving SME’s financing conditions: developing venture capital investment, easing 
SME’s access to credit
2
 
. Policies addressing SME’s growth implicitly assume that improving 
access to finance for SMEs is essential if an SME is to tap into its growth and innovation 
potential. Financial constraints are indeed an important barrier to SME’s growth: small 
businesses informational opacity limits their capacity to raise external funds in order to 
finance investment opportunities. (Berger et al., 2001). However, it could be the case that 
small businesses deliberately calibrate their growth rate. 
In this article, I study how family control influences firms’ economic growth. First, family 
control negatively influences firm growth by reducing the firm financing capacity. On the 
one hand, family control directly limits firm financing capacity as it creates an endemic 
financing constraint by limiting the external financial resources to debt. This direct limit to 
firm financing capacity is related to family preference for financial independence and 
corporate governance issues linked to institutional imperfections. On the other hand, family 
control also indirectly influences firm financing capacity through its influence on firm 
performance. When firms undergo financing constraints they rely heavily on internal 
resources to finance growth. In the presence of financial constraints, only well performing 
firms are thus able to grow and firm investment is sensitive to the firm performance 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). The empirical literature on large family businesses observes a 
negative relationship between family control and firm performance (Morck  et al., 2005). 
Therefore, if family control undermines firm performance it will indirectly limit the firm 
financing capacity by reducing its self-financing capacity.  
Secondly, small businesses could also deliberately calibrate their growth, thus adopt a 
conservative growth behavior. One rationale to deliberately undermine the business growth is 
to maintain business’s opacity in front of tax authorities (Hillman, 2009). Small businesses 
and particularly those family controlled are entities where tax evasion incentives are high. 
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Indeed, small family businesses are generally localized in industries where there is a direct 
relationship with the ultimate consumer, which facilitates tax evasion.  Moreover,  their 
concentrated control structure reinforces their opacity. Data on the actual tax evasion is hard 
to collect due to the secret nature of the activity: for France it is estimated between 30 and 40 
billion Euros, accounting for 2,3% of the French GDP. More interestingly, the fraud seems 
concentrated in the VAT and non declared work
3
An alternative explanation to such conservative growth behavior is that family control raises 
the firm’s cost of capital. Indeed, beyond family business, there is a family, whose wealth is 
mostly concentrated in the firm’s capital.  Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), 
document that owners of private companies in the US have invested on average 41% of their 
net worth in private equity. 
.  
Ød
Family specific time horizon and portfolio structure might affect its behavior toward growth 
as it influences the evaluation of growth opportunities because family investor cost of capital 
is higher (Himmelberg 2002).  
eegard (2009) observes that this private wealth exposure 
increases with ownership concentration. Therefore, small family businesses owners are 
exposed to high levels of idiosyncratic risk resulting from the under diversification of their 
asset portfolio. Moreover, family controlled firms are specific in that they have a larger time 
horizon and are not accountable for short term results. The desire to perpetuate business for 
future generations provides a special incentive to manage capital effectively: invest financial 
capital without the threat of liquidation over long periods (McConaughy and Phillips, 1999). 
Family firms’ longer time horizon implies attributing more importance to the firm’s survival 
rather than to strict adherence to wealth maximization.  
 
The aim of this paper is to disentangle the financing capacity from  the conservative 
growth behavior effect of family control on firm economic growth. I empirically examine the 
relationship between family control and economic growth for a large panel of French SMEs. 
Family control is related to the ownership stakes of family members in the firm. First, I 
consider the influence of family control on economic growth. Secondly, I define sustainable 
growth: the growth potential allowed by the internal holding of cash flows and compare the 
effective economic growth rate to the sustainable growth rate. This original methodology 
allows for the disentangling of the financing capacity and the conservative growth behavior 
effect of family control on firm economic growth.  
                                                 
3 The data is available in the latest issue of  report of the French “Conseil des prélèvements obligatoire” 
http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CPO/documents/divers/RapportCPOSurLaFraude150207Pdf.pdf.   4 
Results indicate a negative relationship between family control and small businesses 
economic growth, related to the fact that small family businesses do not exploit all their 
growth potential.  First, I observe that family control has a negative influence on firm 
economic growth: a firm’s sales growth and investment rates are generally lower when a 
family controls the firm. Secondly, family ownership concentration, particularly in smaller 
and younger firms, led to an under-exploitation of the growth potential allowed by the firm 
internal financing capacity. Results provide evidence on the existence of conservative growth 
behavior in small family businesses.  
 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology adopted 
to isolate the conservative behavior effect from the financing effect of family control on firm 
growth. Section 3 describes the data and defines the variables. Section 4 presents the results 
on the influence of family control on firm growth. Section 5 provides robustness tests of the 
results presented in section 4, and section 6 concludes.   
 
2  DISENTANGLING THE FINANCING CAPACITY FROM THE CONSERVATIVE BEHAVIOR EFFECT 
This paper captures the influence of family control on firm growth. Contrary to 
ownership, there is no agreement in the literature on the notion of control. Several authors 
argue that control is related to ownership concentration, which increases the probability of 
being the controlling shareholder. This approach considers control to be continuous in 
ownership concentration. However, when ownership is not dispersed,  several large 
shareholders might arise and they are able to form coalitions and contest the control of the 
dominant shareholder. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) consider that control can only be 
achieved with at least 50% of the voting rights in weakly dispersed ownership structures. 
Empirically, Gugler and Yortoglu (2003)  show that the presence of an important second 
shareholder influences German corporation governance. 
In order to test whether control is continuous or discrete in ownership concentration I use two 
alternative measures of family control: on the one hand the ownership stakes of the family, 
and on the other hand the effective control by distinguishing firms according to the voting 
power allowed by the voting rights of the family: minority, majority and total control. 
 
  The literature has mainly focused on the fact that family control influence firm 
economic growth because it limits firm resources to its internal financing capacity. First,   5 
small family businesses bear a financial constraint endemic to their peculiar capital structure: 
they are, in essence, firms where capital is concentrated in the hands of the family. Thus, 
refusal of an outside increase in equity capital, implying a dilution of family control, is an 
obvious characteristic of family businesses (Ang, James and Floyd, 1995). Refusal to open 
firm capital imposes a strong financial constraint upon family controlled firms, preventing 
them from gathering enough funds to finance growth opportunities. Overall, family controlled 
firms face a continuous arbitrage between firm growth strategy and private benefits of control. 
Alternatively, family control might result from institutional imperfections: reduced investor 
protection limits outside investors’ willingness to invest. La Porta et al. (2000) observe that 
French investors are less well-protected by law than investors operating in Common Law 
countries. Family taste for independence or lack of protection of outside investors undermines 
firm growth by imposing a constraint on the financing of new projects: economic growth is 
calibrated by family management to maintain compatibility between growth rate and 
financing independence.  
  Secondly, family control also indirectly influences firm financing capacity through its 
effect on firm performance. In the literature, the influence of family control on firm 
profitability is a controversial issue. Agency theory states that large shareholders have strong 
incentives to maximize their firm’s value and have the incentives to collect information and 
oversee managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Moreover, 
resource-based approaches suggest that scarce, valuable, imperfectly imitable and non-
replaceable resources can create a sustained competitive advantage, and improve family firm 
performance (Barney, 1991). According to Hitt and Sirmon (2003), the specificity of family 
firms’ capital, and more particularly the family resource management, allows family firms to 
generate a competitive advantage.  
However, large shareholders can extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), which results in a poor utilization of resources. 
Empirical evidence provides strong support for this two sided incentive effect of ownership 
concentration. Most studies find a non-monotonic relation between ownership concentration 
and firm performance (Morck et al. 1988; and Müller and Spitz-Oener 2006, for medium 
sized German firms). 
Finally, inefficiency could also arise from the passing of control from father to son. Caselli 
and Gennaoli (2003) develop a model of dynastic management showing that there is a 
potential source of inefficiency arising from the difference in skills and talents of 
management between the heirs and their parents. Bennedsen, Nielsen, and Pérez-Gonzalez   6 
(2007) report potential underperformance of firms run by the descendant of the founder, for a 
sample of Danish firms.  
 
  In order to control for both the direct and indirect effect of family control on firm 
financing capacity I use sustainable growth: the maximum rate at which firms can grow 
without altering their financial structure. Sustainable growth is the rate of economic growth 
that maintains unchanged  debt leverage and avoids increasing the share of outside 
shareholders (Higgings, 2007). Therefore, sustainable growth is the growth potential allowed 
by the firm’s  internal resources  generated by its performance.  Then, sustainable growth 
allows to control both for the direct and indirect effect of firm financing capacity on growth. 
In order to assess to what extent firms exploit their growth potential I construct a gap variable: 
the difference between the sustainable growth rate and the actual economic growth rate of the 
firm. This variable indicates to what extent the firm exploits the growth potential offered by 
its internal resources. This original methodology then allows one to asses if family control is 
associated  to conservative growth behavior: does family control prevent  firms  from fully 
exploiting the growth potential allowed by their internal resources? 
 
3  SAMPLE AND VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
3.1  DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
A criticism often directed at empirical work on family firms is the utilization of small, 
localized, non probabilistic samples that limit the generalization of the findings (Danes et al, 
1998). This study should not fall into that critique as I use a very large sample, where all the 
relevant information is available for 22 237 French SMEs over the 1997-2003 period. 
The data comes from the DIANE database, provided by COFACE Services, and contains 
two types of information. First, all balance sheets and results account information that allows 
computing growth rates and financial ratios. Secondly, the main advantage of the DIANE 
database is to furnish information about the ownership structure, in particular the name and 
shares of the main shareholders. The ownership structure information is used to compute the 
global ownership by members of the same family.  
   7 
The initial database extracted from DIANE
4 lists almost 1 million firms. Because this 
study focuses on small businesses I exclude the firms with annual sales higher than 50 million 
Euros
5 and firms with annual sales lower than 750 000 Euros, those latter firms are excluded 
because of the poor reliability of micro firm accounting data. This first selection criterium 
leads to a sample containing 231 000 firms. Then, firms that are not directly controlled by an 
individual are excluded using the variable on shareholder type. Thus, the sample is only 
constituted of independent firms where the main shareholder is an individual, firms affiliated 
to business groups or controlled by a financial institution or the State are excluded from the 
sample. This latter selection criterium is adopted to discard the possible interaction with group 
affiliation effects. Firms from the agricultural sector
6
 
 are also excluded. Finally, I obtain a 
sample containing 92 212 firms corresponding to the size and independence criteria. From 
this sample I am able to use 22 237 observations because of the lack of ownership stakes 
and/or of two subsequent years of accounting data.  
3.2   VARIABLES 
The initial information contained in the DIANE database consists of the name and shares of 
main shareholders. To obtain the family ownership variable the percentage of firm’ shares 
held by shareholders having the same name are cumulated for each firm
7
Family is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the family ownership stake in the firm is 
higher than 50%. In order to account for plausible non monotonic effect of family ownership 
on firm growth I also build three indicative variables of control:  
.  
Minority control: this variable takes value 1 if the family owns less than 50% of a       
firm’s shares and 0 else. 
Majority control: this variable takes value 1 if the family owns more than 50% but 
less than 100% of a firm’s shares and 0 else. 
Total control: this variable takes value 1 if the family owns 100% of a firm’s shares 
and 0 else.  
                                                 
 
5 The threshold of 50 million Euros of turnover is chosen according to the threshold defined by the European 
Commission in its recommendation concerning the definition of an SME. 
6 Firms from the agricultural sector are excluded from the sample because they have a peculiar financial 
behaviour. First they performance is highly dependent of the market prices and whether conditions. Secondly, ., 
this activity is highly dependent upon the subvention from the EU and the government. 
7 This approach under evaluates the share of a family, as members of the family that do not have the same name 
(as son in law, for example) are excluded.  However, this operation was made for each firms individually 
therefore it is really unlikely that ownership shares of the family are over estimated.   8 
Descriptive statistics, reported in table 1, underline the important concentration of ownership 
in sample firms: on average families own 63% of a firm’s shares and 80% of sample firms are 
controlled by families. 
To explore the relationship between family control and a firm’s growth I use economic 
growth and sustainable growth. Economic growth is captured using the firm’s annual growth 
rate of sales and investment rate.  
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On the one hand, I exclude the financial assets when computing investment because this type 
of investment does not participate directly to firm growth: financial assets are the amount 
invested by the firm in another firm, this study focuses on internal growth.  On the other hand, 
I include working capital in the investment as it participates in the production process of the 
firm, especially in firms in non-manufacturing industries.  
Firm average economic growth is significantly influenced by family control:  family 
controlled firms have, on average, a one point lower economic growth rate than non family 
controlled firms (see table 1). But, the effect of family control on growth is not monotonic: 
totally controlled firms tend to growth significantly more than majority controlled firms (table 
1, panel C). 
 
The  sustainable growth rate  corresponds to the annual growth rate of retained 
earnings:  
t i t i t i ROE e tentionRat eGrowth Sustainabl , , , Re × =    9 
The sustainable growth rate is influenced by the financial performance and the distribution 
policy of the firm. The financial performance is measured by the return on equity (ROE): the 
ratio of net income on firm total assets. But, it is not possible to compute firms’ retention rate 
because the information is not correctly filled in the database. The sustainable growth rate is 
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Finally, gap variables allow the assessment of the extent to which firms exploit their 
growth potential. Those variables are the difference between the sustainable growth rate and 
the economic growth rate of the firm:  
i i i h SalesGrowt eGrowth Sustainabl GapSales − =  
i i i Investment eGrowth Sustainabl ent GapInvestm − =  
Descriptive statistics in table1 indicate that, on average, sample firms do not exploit all their 
growth potential. Results also underline that the influence of family control on the gap 
between sustainable growth and economic growth is mixed: there is no significant difference 
between family and non family controlled firms, but totally controlled firms exploit 
significantly less their growth potential than majority controlled firms. 
 
In order to isolate the influence of family control on firm growth it is necessary to control 
for the other factors that influence firm growth.  
First, technological factors such as the importance of economies of scale in the industry, 
the size of the market where businesses operate influence a firm’s growth (Kumar et al., 
1999). In order to take into account those factors three variables control for firm’s industry, 
size and age.  
The firm’s industry refers to the firm belonging to one industry in a 17 sector classification 
(very close to the NACE classification). Sample firms are localized in traditional SME 
industries: construction, retail trade and services. Since size limits small firms’ capacity to 
enter the industrial sectors where economies of scale and initial investment are high, such a 
result is not surprising. To some extent, the industry dummies also allow to control for a 
firm’s growth opportunities.   10 
Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm in the last year for which accounting information 
was available. Total assets rather than turnover is used to proxy for firm size in order to avoid 
mechanical correlation with the sales growth rate. Firms in the sample are quite small, and 
family control does not significantly influence the average firm size. But, firms totally 
controlled by a family are on average smaller than other sample firms (see table 1).  
Firm age is the number of years since firm creation. Descriptive statistics indicate that family 
controlled firms are significantly older than non family controlled firms (table 1, panel B). 
Panel C indicates that majority controlled firms are older, whereas totally family controlled 
firms are, on average, of the same age as non family controlled firms.  
  Secondly, sustainable growth assumes that the firm maintains its debt leverage 
constant, but such a policy can be difficult to uphold if firms undergo credit constraints, 
which is likely for small businesses. Indeed, small businesses’ informational opacity limits 
SME ability to raise external funds (Berger et al., 2001).  The imperfect information 
environment can create moral hazard issues that raise the concern for risk-shifting behavior of 
small businesses. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) shareholders have incentives to 
expropriate creditors by shifting toward riskier projects. Moreover, the lack of transparency 
creates an adverse selection effect and the narrowing of the credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). Small firms have, therefore, to pay higher interest rates or cannot obtain preferred loan 
amounts. In other words, expected problems related to the lack of transparency of small firms 
leads  commercial banks to anticipate higher monitoring and screening costs. Those 
anticipations lead to raised risk premiums, which in turn increases the cost of external capital.  
Family control might exacerbate the agency cost of debt because of higher private benefits of 
control or managerial entrenchment. However, family firm characteristics (undiversified 
family holdings, the desire to pass the firm onto subsequent generations, and reputation 
issues) suggest that the divergence of interests between family shareholders and creditors is 
lower. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) find support for this hypothesis in a sample of 252 
industrial large US firms. Indeed, they observe that the cost of debt financing for family firms 
is about thirty-two percent basis points lower than in non-family firms. 
I use two variables in order to capture the level of credit constraints the firm faces. First, the 
financial solvency variable is the belonging of the firm to a ten grade rating system provided 
by COFACE. This variable measures the financial solvency of the firm and its credit quality. 
A better quality improves the availability of financial resources: a higher score indicates an 
increased financial solvency which eases firm access to credit. Secondly, the bank leverage is 
the average of annual ratios of financial debt to total assets. One the one hand, bank leverage   11 
accounts for the firm’s ease of access to bank borrowing. But, on the other hand as bank 
leverage increases the firm might find it more difficult to borrow. 
Statistics in table 1 underline that family control is associated with higher bank leverage: 
totally controlled firms are more indebted (58%) on average. This result is not surprising as 
the only source of long term external finance for totally controlled firms is either the family’s 
wealth or debt. Minority controlled firms are on average less solvent that family controlled 
firm, but there is no significant difference in the average solvency score between totally and 
majority controlled firms.   
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
4  FAMILY CONTROL AND SMALL BUSINESSES GROWTH 
 
4.1  FAMILY CONTROL AND FIRM’S ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Graphical evidence (figure 1) underlines that family controlled firms (majority or totally 
controlled firms) have a lower median economic growth rate than minority controlled firms 
over the 1997-2003 period. Graphs a and b indicate that the difference between growth rates 
tend to be reduced in periods of economic downturn: between 2000 and 2001 the growth rate 
of minority controlled firms decreased more than the one of family controlled firms, this trend 
is even more pronounced when considering the investment rate. Graphs c and d, underline the 
non monotonic influence of family control on growth: majority controlled firms  have 
systematically a lower growth rate than totally controlled firms. Totally controlled firms even 
have a higher investment rate than non minority controlled firm in the 2000-2003 period.   
Aggregate evidence 
Aggregate evidence on firm economic growth suggests that family control influences firm 
growth negatively and non monotically. Aggregate evidence also suggests that family control 
reduces firms’ growth sensitivity to economic downturns. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Firm level evidence   12 
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where,  ε   is the error term, Family  is either family ownership or the dummy variables 
indicating the intensity of family control for firm i, Economic Growth is either the average 
annual sales growth or investment rate for firm i, and Control  are the different control 
variables for firm i. Tables 2 and 3 present the results of ordinary least square estimation of 
the model parameters respectively for the average annual sales growth and investment rates 
over the 1997-2003 period.  
 
Specifications 1 and 2 in table 2 investigate the univariate effect of family control on firm 
sales growth rate. The dummy variable Family has the expected sign: family control has a 
significant and negative influence on firm growth. The negative influence of family control on 
firm sales growth rate remains significant and negative controlling for technological factors 
(specification 4), firm financial performance (specification 7), and firm’s ease to access credit 
(specification 10). Results are very similar when considering investment rate (table 3), except 
that the economic influence of family control is higher in this case (the value of the estimated 
coefficients is higher).  
The Family Ownership variable has either an insignificant (table 3) or positive influence 
(table 2) on firm economic growth, but the family ownership variable becomes insignificant 
after controlling for firm financial performance (ROE). The ambiguous effect of family 
ownership on firm economic growth provides evidence on the fact that family control 
influence on firm growth is rather discrete than continuous. Moreover, results confirm the non 
monotonic effect of family control on  firm economic growth: majority controlled firms 
underperform minority and totally controlled firms (specifications 3, 6, 9 and 12 in tables 2 
and 3).  
In brief, results show that family control has a discrete and non monotonic negative 
influence on firm economic growth. Such results are consistent with those of corporate 
governance studies on the influence of ownership on firm performance (see for example the 
seminal study of Morck et al., 1988). 
[Insert table 2 and 3 about here] 
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The signs of the estimates of the control variables are as expected and consistent across 
the different specifications. Firm size has a positive influence on firm economic growth. The 
positive influence of firm size on its economic growth seems related to technological 
arguments rather than to informational issues: accounting for firm solvency does not 
undermine the significance of firm size. Firm age negatively influences firm growth, which is 
quite intuitive: as firms get older, they are closer to their stationary size and thus stabilize 
firm’s growth rate. Firm financial performance has a strong positive influence on firm growth. 
On the one hand, a good financial performance is important for small financially constrained 
firms because internal financing constitutes the main resource to finance growth. On the other 
hand, good financial performance could also indicate that the firm has good growth 
opportunities. The financial solvency score has a negative effect on firm growth, this score 
increases when firm solvency and global risk are lower, this indicates that in order to grow 
firms need to take on risk. Finally, the bank leverage ratio only significantly and positively 
influences the investment rate. Only firms that are able to access bank finance are able to 
finance their growth project, which explains the positive relationship between bank leverage 
and firm growth.  
 
4.2  FAMILY CONTROL AND CONSERVATIVE GROWTH BEHAVIOR 
 
To explore whether family control engenders conservative growth behavior I estimate the 
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where,  ε   is the error term, Family  is either family ownership or the dummy variables 
indicating the intensity of family control for firm i, Gap is the difference between the average 
sustainable growth rate on the period and the average sales growth or investment rate of firm 
i, and Control are the different control variables for firm i. In this setup I do not control for 
firm performance as it would be redundant with the sustainable growth measure. Tables 4 and 
5 present the results of ordinary least square estimation of the model parameters respectively 
for the average annual sales growth and investment rates over the 1997-2003 period.  
 
Specifications 1 and 2 in tables 4 and 5 investigate the univariate effect of family control 
on firm gap between sustainable and economic growth. The dummy variable Family does not   14 
significantly influence the gap between sustainable growth and economic growth, whereas the 
Family Ownership  variable has a significant and positive influence on firm conservative 
growth behavior captured by the gap variable. Results (see specification 3) also indicate that 
only totally controlled firms adopt conservative behavior: the dummy variable Totally 
Controlled has a significant and positive effect on the Gap variable. Globally, results show 
that conservative growth behavior (i.e. the fact that firms do not exploit fully their growth 
potential) is monotonic in the concentration of family ownership. Similar results are observed 
for the gap between sustainable growth and investment rate (see table 5).  
 
[Insert table 4 and 5 about here] 
 
The positive and monotonic influence of family ownership concentration on the Gap 
measures remains significant controlling for technological factors (specifications 4 to 6), but, 
the significance decreases from the 1% to the 10% level of error when controlling for firm 
ease to access credit (specifications 7 to 9). This diminution of the significance is related to 
the correlation between family ownership and bank  debt  leverage, remind that family 
controlled firms are, on average, in greater debt than minority controlled firms. Indeed, bank 
debt leverage has a positive and economically important effect on the difference between 
sustainable and economic growth rate. Results also indicate that more indebted firms tend to 
exploit their growth potential  less  over the period considered. There are two alternative 
explanations to this result. On the one hand, more indebted firms have greater difficulty to 
raise new debt and maintain their debt level (ie. reduce their debt leverage), which in turn, 
limits their capacity to reach their sustainable growth rate. On the other hand, highly indebted 
firms might use their internal financing capacity to reduce firm debt rather than financing firm 
growth. 
 
Firm size undermines firm conservative growth behavior, this observation is consistent 
with the fact that size positively influences firm growth. This result provides support to the 
idea that smaller firms tend to maintain their size in order to avoid several fiscal and social 
constraints: French legislation, especially labor law is differentiated according to firm size 
and smaller firms benefit from several tax advantages, moreover maintaining a smaller size 
reduces the visibility of plausible tax evasion activities. 
Firm age has a negative effect on the conservative behavior toward growth: younger family 
controlled firms are more prone to adopt a conservative growth behavior. Overall, the signs   15 
on the control variables indicate that the conservative growth behavior is more pronounced in 
firms that are financially fragile and opaque: firms that adopt conservative growth tend to be 
family controlled, younger, smaller and in greater debt.  
 
Results show that family control engenders conservative behavior toward growth: the fact 
that  firms do not fully  exploit their growth potential  is encouraged by family ownership 
concentration. The influence of family control on the extent to which firms exploit their 
growth potential has two alternative (but not exclusive) explanations.  
On the one hand, higher ownership concentration by the family is related to higher under 
diversification, which increases the family portfolio risk. The higher exposure to the firm 
specific risk then raises the return required by family investors to accept the project 
(Himmelberg  et al., 2002). On the other hand, family controlled firm  could deliberately 
calibrate their growth in order to avoid suspicion of tax authorities or fiscal and social 
obligations related to increase in firm size.  
 
5  ROBUSTNESS 
 
5.1  TESTING ON THE YEAR FOR WHICH THE OWNERSHIP INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
As it is often the case, ownership data is only provided for one year. Until now, I 
assumed that ownership structure was stable across the years I scrutinized, in order to control 
for this possible bias I estimate models 3 and 4 for the year the ownership information is 
provided for the firm considered.  
In order to estimate the model on a cross section I introduce lag variables because growth 
today results from the financing conditions of the preceding year. Therefore, I estimate the 
firm economic growth using the lag of control variables, and the gap variable is defined as the 
difference between the previous year sustainable growth rate and the actual economic growth 
rate. Indeed, the sustainable growth rate of a given year provides funding for the firm to use 
the next year. The following model is estimated and years dummy control for the fact that the 
ownership information is available in different years according to the firm considered. 
, ,
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where  t i t i t i owth EconomicGr eGrowth Sustainabl Gap , 1 , , − = − (4) 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of models (3) and (4) using the three alternative 
measures for family control. 
  First, results indicate that the findings in section 4 are consistent. Family control has a 
significant negative non monotonic influence on firm sales growth (specification 1 and 3 in 
table 6). Results also confirm the fact that family ownership does not significantly influence 
firm sales growth (specification 2 in table 6). However, results on the influence of family 
control on firm investment show that family control does not significantly influence firm 
investment. The estimation on a yearly basis gives less performing models, I interpret this 
result as showing that small businesses’ growth is rather a time-discrete phenomena: because 
small businesses are resources constrained, they need to accumulate resources for several 
years before being are able to finance a new investment project. Secondly, results confirm that 
family ownership increases firms’ conservative growth behavior (specifications 7 to 12 in 
table 6).  
 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
Overall, results on the one year estimation confirm that results presented thus far are not 
driven by the fact that ownership information is only available for one year. Moreover, the 
lower explanatory  power of the year estimation is  related to the fact that small business 
growth is not continuous but occurs rather by discrete investments when the firm has gathered 
enough financial resources to finance investment. 
 
5.2  TESTING FOR ENDOGENEITY: DO FIRMS REMAIN FAMILY CONTROLLED BECAUSE THEY 
GROW LESS? 
Causality is an important concern when predicting performance according to the firm 
control structure. In the models presented thus far it is assumed that family control drives firm 
performance. However, firms could remain family controlled because of their lower 
performance: firm growth might be the factor driving firm ownership structure.    17 
It is possible to control for simultaneity bias (when the independent variable is correlated with 
the error term) using instrumental variable (IV) regression. IV methodology allows one to 
obtain consistent estimates in the presence of simultaneity between the performance and the 
ownership variable. The method usually adopted in the literature is the two stage least square 
estimation (2SLS). In the first stage, a set of instrumental variables are used to isolate the 
movements of ownership that are uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage 
regression, which estimates firm growth.  
 
I use two types of variables for family control: on the one hand, a continuous variable: 
family ownership and on the other hand, discrete variables (family, minority, majority, total 
control). In order to instrument for family ownership I estimate family ownership using OLS, 
for the dummy variables of family control I use the method proposed by Degryse and Ongena 
(2001) where the first stage regression is a logistic regression.  
In order to determine which variables to use as instruments for family control, I reviewed the 
literature on corporate governance, especially the literature focusing on endogenous 
ownership. This literature suggests that the main factors explaining ownership concentration 
are related to the extent of private benefits extraction. Therefore, in countries or industries 
with low investor protection, ownership concentration is more likely (Stulz, 2005). To proxy 
for investor protection I use asset tangibility (the ratio of fixed assets over total assets), indeed 
higher assets tangibility is linked to “harder to steal” technology. Moreover, ownership 
concentration is strongly influenced by informational issues, therefore I use both firm age and 
size to proxy for firm informational opacity.  
The first stage regression is therefore: 
) 5 ( 4 3 2 1 i i i i i bility AssetTangi Size Age Family ε β β β β + + + + =
 
Results indicate that the instruments are strong: the F statistic is higher than 10, indicating that 
the instruments significantly explain variations in family ownership. 
 
Then, in the second stage the predicted values of the family control variables are used 
as independent variables in order to predict firm growth. Equation 1 is estimated using the 
predicted values for family. 
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  Results in table 7 confirm previous results: family control has a negative influence on 
firm economic growth. Parameter estimates also show that the economic significance of the 
influence of family control on firm economic growth is even stronger when controlling for the 
plausible endogeneity problem. Overall, results of the IV estimation indicate that the negative 
influence of family control remains significant and that the negative relationship between firm 
economic growth and family control does not only result from the fact that firms remain 
family controlled because they have a lower growth potential.  
 
6  CONCLUSION 
 
Results show that in small businesses, family control negatively influences firm economic 
growth, and that this negative influence of family control on firm economic growth is partly 
driven by the fact that family controlled firms adopt a conservative growth behavior. On the 
one hand, results underline that family control has a non monotonic negative influence on 
firm economic growth, measured by sales growth rate and investment rates: indeed, majority 
controlled firms grow less than totally controlled firms. This result is consistent with the non 
monotonic effect of ownership concentration on firm performance underlined in the corporate 
governance literature. On the other hand, using an original methodology based on the 
difference between the growth potential allowed by internal resources (sustainable growth) 
and the actual economic growth, this paper shows that family control is related to 
conservative growth behavior. This conservative behavior is primarily observed in small and 
young firms where family ownership concentration is high. Results also underline that the 
influence of family control on firm economic growth does not arise from an inverse causality 
link: firms grow less because they are family controlled, they do not remain family controlled 
because they grow less. 
 
Results are consistent with the hypothesis that family control influences small business 
growth and not only because family control limits  a  firm’s financing capacity. Current 
policies dedicated to small firms’ development focus, almost exclusively, on increasing their 
financing capacity. In line with the paper results, policies aiming to favor small businesses’ 
growth should also take into account the factors that lead family controlled small businesses 
to not fully exploit their growth potential.   19 
On the one hand, the conservative growth behavior of family controlled firms results from the 
under diversification of family investor portfolio. First, encouraging venture capital could 
favor the dilution of family ownership and increase family investors’ portfolio diversification. 
Secondly, specific insurance/buffer mechanisms could lower the family wealth exposure in 
case of the firm default. Finally, policy makers could encourage family entrepreneurs’ human 
capital diversification in order to facilitate their reconversion in case of failure. However, 
those policies need to be closely calibrated in order to not distort the entrepreneur’s incentives 
and lead them to excessive risk taking. Thus, future research addressing the optimality of such 
contract will be really interesting.  
On the other hand, this article also provides evidence consistent with the argument according 
to which “people in the shadow economy are limited in applying their abilities” (Hillman, 
2009, p287). Results point out an important inefficiency of the possibility for tax or social 
evasion that creates an incentive to limit business expansion. Consistent with the results 
provided by this article, government trying to boost the dynamism of small businesses should 
also focus in limiting the incentives for tax evasion. Limiting the incentives for tax evasion 
would then give small family controlled businesses the incentives to fully exploit their growth 
potential. Future research could be dedicated to develop the incentives for limiting size firm 
size expansion present in the fiscal and social legislation environment of SMEs. 
 
7  Acknowledgment 
The author thanks Michel Dietsch, Nicolas Eber, Edith Ginglinger, Ayre Hillman, Joseph 
Trojman, Ariane Szafarz and two anonymous rewievers for helpful comments.  
8  References 
Anderson, R., S. Mansi and D. Reeb 2003, Founding family ownership and the agency cost of 
debt, Journal of financial economics 68, 263--285. 
Ang, J., W. James, and T. Floyd 1995, Evidence of the lack of separation between business 
and personal risks among small businesses, Journal of Small Business Finance 42/3, 197--
210. 
Barney, J 1991, Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, Journal of Management 
17, 99--120. 
Bennedsen, M.,  and  D. Wolfenzon 2000, The Balance of Power in Closely Held 
Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 113—139.   20 
Bennedsen, M., K. Nielsen, and F.Pérez--Gonzalez 2007, Inside the family firm: The role of 
families in succession decisions and performance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 2, 
647--691. 
Berger A., L. Klapper, and G. Udell 2001, The ability of banks to lend to informationally 
opaque small businesses, Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 2127-- 2167. 
Carpenter, R., and B. Petersen 2002, Is the growth of small firms constrained by internal 
finance? The Review of Economics and Statistics 842, 298--309. 
Caselli, F. and N. Gennaoli 2003, Dynastic management, NBER WP 9442. 
Gugler, K. and B. Yortoglu 2003, Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in 
Germany, European Economic Review 47, 731—758. 
Degryse, H. and S. Ongena 2001, Bank relationships and firm profitability, Financial 
Management, 9—34. 
Higgins R. 2007. Analysis for financial management, 8
th
Hillman, A. 2009. Public finance and public policy:  Responsibilities and limitations of 
governments, 2
  edition, McGraw--Hill Higher 
Education, New York. 
nd
Himmelberg , C., G. Hubbard, and I. Love (2002), “ Investor protection, ownership, and the 
cost of capital”,  
 edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hitt, M. and D. Sirmon 2003, Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, 
and wealth relation in family firms, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 27, 339--358. 
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling 1976,Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost, and 
ownership structure, Journal of financial Economics 3 4, 305--360. 
Kumar, K., R. Rajan and L. Zingales 1999, What Determines firm size? NBER WP7208. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez--De--Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny 2000, Investor protection and 
corporate governance Journal of Financial Economics 58 1, 1--25. 
McConaughy, D, and G. Phillips 1999, Founders versus descendants: The profitability, 
efficiency, growth characteristics and financing in large, public, founding--family--controlled 
firms, Family Business Review 12, 123--132. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny 1988, Management ownership and market valuation, 
Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293--315. 
Morck, R., D. Wolfenzon, and B. Yeung 2005, Corporate governance, economic 
entrenchment and growth, Journal of Economic Literature 43 3, 655--730. 
Moskowitz, T. and A. Vissing--Jørgensen 2002, The returns to entrepreneurial investment: A 
private equity premium puzzle?, American Economic Review 92, 745--778.   21 
Müller, E., and A. Spitz--Oener 2006, Managerial ownership and company performance in 
German small and medium--sized private enterprises, German Economic Review 7, 233--247. 
Ødegaard, B. 2009, The diversification cost of large, concentrated equity stakes. How big is 
it? Is it justified? Finance Research Letters 62, 56--72
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance 52, 
737--783 
. 
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of 
Political Economy 94, 461--488.  
Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss 1981,
Stulz, R. (2005)“The Limits of financial Globalization,” Journal of Finance 60(4), 1595-
1638. 
  Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, 
American Economic Review 71 3, 393--410. 
 
 
















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Non family controlled firms Family controlled firms












1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002




































1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Minority Family control Majority family control Total family control  24 
 











Mean Standard Error Median Minimum Maximum
Turnover Growth 0,09 0,11 0,07 -0,22 1,84
Investment Growth 0,11 0,16 0,08 -0,63 8,11
Return on Equity 0,20 0,18 0,17 -1,94 2,33
Ownership Concentration 63 26 51 1 100
Size (Total Assets) 2204771 2984166 127632 109189 79745253
Turnover 3486105 4672905 1952573 750122 49389419
Age 21,14 13,54 17,00 6,00 200,00
Financial Solvency Score 5,54 2,98 6,00 1,00 10,00
Bank Leverage 0,41 0,94 0,19 -0,74 61,36
Sustainable growth - Turnover growth 0,19 0,53 0,08 -1,57 9,64
Sustainable growth -Investment growth 0,17 0,53 0,07 -7,50 9,61
Minority Control  Family Control 
Mean Mean Mean difference
Number of observations
4462 17775
Turnover Growth 0,10 0,09 0,0146***
Investment Growth 0,13 0,11 0,0211***
Return on Equity 0,20 0,20 0,00
Family ownership 34 71 -37
Size (Total Assets) 2190000 2180000 10522
Age 19,24 21,62 -2,381***
Financial Solvency Score 5,39 5,58 -0,195***
Bank Leverage 0,35 0,43 -0,08***
Sustainable growth - Turnover growth 0,18 0,19 -0,01
Sustainable growth -Investment growth 0,16 0,17 -0,01
Total Family control Majority Family control 
Mean Mean Mean difference
Number of observations
4279 13496
Turnover Growth 0,10 0,09 0,0117***
Investment Growth 0,11 0,10 0,0107***
Return on Equity 0,24 0,19 0,0574***
Family Ownership  100 61 39
Size (Total Assets) 1770000 2310000 -543032***
Age 19,99 22,14 -2,1549***
Financial Solvency Score 5,59 5,58 0,0138
Bank Leverage 0,58 0,38 0,2032***
Sustainable growth - Turnover growth 0,23 0,18 0,0490***
Sustainable growth -Investment growth 0,21 0,16 0,0501***
***indicates that the t-test of mean differences is significant at the 1% level,
Panel A: Desciptive statistics full sample 
(N=22237)
Panel B: Mean comparison accoding to 
family control (N=22237)
Panel C: Mean comparision in family 
controlled firm sub-sample (N=17770)  25 
   26 
Table 2: Family control influence on average sales growth rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Family -0,0146 *** -0,0066 *** -0,0081 *** -0,0080 ***
0,0019 0,0019 0,0018 0,0018
Family ownership 0,0001 *** 0,0001 *** 0,0001 ** 4,9060E-05 *
2,9440E-05 2,8240E-05 2,78E-05 2,7860E-05
Total family control -0,0056 ** 0,0012 -0,0049 ** -0,0050 **
0,0025 0,0024 0,0023 0,0023
Majority family control -0,0174 *** -0,0091 *** -0,0091 *** -0,0090 ***
0,0020 0,0019 0,0019 0,0019
Size (Log total asset) 0,0124 *** 0,0125 *** 0,0128 *** 0,0134 *** 0,0134 *** 0,0135 *** 0,0139 *** 0,0139 *** 0,0141 ***
0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009
Age -0,0022 *** -0,0022 *** -0,0022 *** -0,0018 *** -0,0018 *** -0,0018 *** -0,0017 *** -0,0017 *** -0,0017 ***
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
ROE 0,1251 *** 0,1239 *** 0,1241 *** 0,1303 *** 0,1292 *** 0,1293 ***
0,0043 0,0043 0,0043 0,0044 0,0044 0,0044
Financial solvency score -0,0020 *** -0,0020 *** -0,0020 ***
0,0003 0,0003 0,0003
Bank leverage 0,0005 0,0003 0,0004
0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Intercept 0,1045 *** 0,0874 *** 0,1045 *** -0,0414 *** -0,0552 *** -0,0471 *** -0,0858 *** -0,0950 *** -0,0877 *** -0,0851 *** -0,0938 *** -0,0869 ***
0,0017 0,0020 0,0017 0,0131 0,0132 0,0131 0,0129 0,0130 0,0129 0,0129 0,0130 0,0129
Industry dummies No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237
F statistics 57,72 8,53 46,12 137,14 137,54 131,27 181,2 180,19 171,95 166,77 165,82 159,05
R2 0,0026 0,0004 0,0041 0,095 0,0952 0,0961 0,128 0,1274 0,1282 0,1305 0,1299 0,1307
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level,
Explained variable: Average sales growth rates  27   28 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Family -0,0210 *** -0,0111 *** -0,0131 *** -0,0131 ***
0,0027 0,0026 0,0025 0,0025
Family ownership 0,0001 0,0001 *** 2,47E-05 4,34E-06
4,08E-05 3,94E-05 3,88E-05 3,88E-05
Total family control -0,0129 **** -0,0038 -0,0121 *** -0,0129 ***
0,0034 0,0033 0,0033 0,0032
Majority family control -0,0236 *** -0,0134 *** -0,0134 *** -0,0132 ***
0,0027 0,0027 0,0026 0,0026
Size (Log total asset) 0,0203 *** 0,0203 *** 0,0207 *** 0,0216 *** 0,0215 *** 0,0216 *** 0,0225 *** 0,0224 **** 0,0225 ***
0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013
Age -0,0030 *** -0,0031 *** -0,0030 *** -0,0025 *** -0,0025 *** -0,0025 *** -0,0024 *** -0,0024 *** -0,0024 ***
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
ROE 0,1694 *** 0,1682 *** 0,1691 *** 0,1780 *** 0,1773 *** 0,1780 ***
0,0060 0,0060 0,0061 0,0061 0,0061 0,0061
Financial solvency score -0,0038 *** -0,0038 *** -0,0038 ***
0,0004 0,0004 0,0004
Bank leverage 0,0034 *** 0,0033 *** 0,0034 ***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011
Intercept 0,1267 *** 0,1058 *** 0,1267 *** -0,1098 *** -0,1260 *** -0,1151 *** -0,1699 *** -0,1800 *** -0,1705 *** -0,1683 *** -0,1770 *** -0,1684 ***
0,0024 0,0028 0,0024 0,0182 0,0184 0,0183 0,0180 0,0182 0,0181 0,0180 0,0181 0,0180
Industry dummies No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237
F statistics 62,5 2,53 38,62 121,53 120,89 115,55 162,93 161,28 154,37 154,53 152,98 147,16
R2 0,0028 0,0001 0,0035 0,0851 0,0847 0,0856 0,1166 0,1156 0,1166 0,1221 0,1211 0,1221
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level
Explained variable: Average investment rates  29 
 
 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family 0,0049 0,0185 ** 0,0114
0,0088 0,0088 0,0087
Family ownership 0,0006 *** 0,0005 *** 0,0002 *
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
Total family control 0,0421 *** 0,0422 *** 0,0214 *
0,0112 0,0112 0,0111
Majority family control -0,0070 0,0110 0,0083
0,0091 0,0091 0,0089
Size (ltotal asset) -0,0403 *** -0,0397 *** -0,0391 *** -0,0418 *** -0,0415 *** -0,0413 ***
0,0044 0,0044 0,0044 0,0043 0,0043 0,0043
Age -0,0038 *** -0,0037 *** -0,0038 *** -0,0031 *** -0,0031 *** -0,0031 ***
0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003
Financial solvency score -0,0030 ** -0,0030 ** -0,0030 **
0,0012 0,0012 0,0012
Bank leverage 0,0977 *** 0,0974 *** 0,0973 ***
0,0038 0,0038 0,0038
Intercept 0,1841 *** 0,1529 *** 0,1841 *** 0,7991 *** 0,7736 *** 0,7819 0,7957 *** 0,7853 *** 0,7885 ***
0,0079 0,0092 0,0079 0,0621 0,0627 0,0623 0,0612 0,0617 0,0614
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22238
F statistics 0,3 16,97 14,34 29,8 30,34 28,79 64,8 64,88 61,67
R2 0 0,0008 0,0013 0,0223 0,0227 0,0228 0,0525 0,0526 0,0526
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level
Explained variable: gap between sustainable growth and sales growth rate  30 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family 0,0113 0,0230 ** 0,0160 *
0,0090 0,0090 0,0088
Family ownership 0,0006 *** 0,0005 *** 0,0003 *
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
Total family control 0,0494 *** 0,0472 *** 0,0272 **
0,0114 0,0114 0,0113
Majority family control -0,0008 0,0153 * 0,0126
0,0092 0,0092 0,0091
Size (ltotal asset) -0,0482 *** -0,0475 *** -0,0469 *** -0,0499 *** -0,0495 *** -0,0493 ***
0,0044 0,0044 0,0044 0,0044 0,0044 0,0044
Age -0,0029 *** -0,0029 *** -0,0029 *** -0,0023 *** -0,0023 *** -0,0023 ***
0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003
Financial solvency score -0,0016 -0,0016 -0,0017
0,0012 0,0012 0,0012
Bank leverage 0,0938 *** 0,0935 *** 0,0933 ***
0,0039 0,0039 0,0039
Intercept 0,1619 *** 0,1345 *** 0,1619 *** 0,8675 *** 0,8444 *** 0,8499 *** 0,8627 *** 0,8537 *** 0,8547 ***
0,0080 0,0094 0,0080 0,0633 0,0639 0,0635 0,0625 0,0630 0,0627
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes
Number of observations 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237
F statistics 1,59 17,67 15,13 25,45 25,85 24,69 55,78 55,79 53,12
R2 0,0001 0,0008 0,0014 0,0191 0,0194 0,0196 0,0455 0,0455 0,0456
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level
Explained variable: gap between sustainable growth and investment rate  31 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 Sales Growth  Sales Growth  Sales Growth  Investment  Investment  Investment GAP Sales GAP Sales GAP Sales GAP Investment GAP Investment GAP Investment
Family -0,0072 ** -0,0037 0,0306 * 0,0265 *
0,0032 0,0040 0,0153 0,0156
Family ownership 0,0001 * 0,0001 ** 0,0007 *** 0,0006 ***
4,9620E-05 0,0001 0,0002 0,0002
Total family control 0,0013 0,0043 0,0428 ** 0,0373 *
0,0042 0,0051 0,0195 0,0200
Majority family control -0,0098 *** -0,0062 0,0268 * 0,0231
0,0033 0,0041 0,0157 0,0161
Size (total asset) 0,0047 *** 0,0047 *** 0,0051 *** 0,0263 *** 0,0264 *** 0,0267 *** -0,0115 -0,0106 -0,0108 -0,0323 *** -0,0314 *** -0,0317 ***
0,0016 0,0016 0,0016 0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0076 0,0076 0,0076 0,0078 0,0078 0,0078
Age -0,0011 *** -0,0011 *** -0,0011 *** -0,0016 *** -0,0016 *** -0,0016 *** -0,0018 *** -0,0017 *** -0,0017 *** -0,0011 ** -0,0010 ** -0,0010 **
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005
ROE 0,0271 *** 0,0261 *** 0,0256 *** 0,0814 *** 0,0801 *** 0,0800 ***
0,0060 0,0060 0,0060 0,0074 0,0074 0,0074
Financial solvency score 0,0009 ** 0,0009 ** 0,0009 ** -0,0037 *** -0,0036 *** -0,0037 *** 0,0027 0,0029 0,0027 0,0067 *** 0,0068 *** 0,0067 ***
0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021
Bank leverage 0,0023 * 0,0022 * 0,0021 * -0,0041 *** -0,0043 *** -0,0044 *** 0,0327 *** 0,0321 *** 0,0324 *** 0,0394 *** 0,0389 *** 0,0391 ***
0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0015 0,0015 0,0015 0,0056 0,0056 0,0057 0,0058 0,0058 0,0058
Intercept -0,0193 -0,0303 -0,0248 -0,2774 *** -0,2895 *** -0,2826 *** 0,2830 *** 0,2494 ** 0,2742 ** 0,5191 *** 0,4886 *** 0,5112 ***
0,0230 0,0232 0,0231 0,0282 0,0285 0,0283 0,1079 0,1089 0,1083 0,1106 0,1116 0,1110
Industry dummies
Number of observations 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237 22237
F statistics 17,09 17,00 16,79 26,37 26,56 25,41 3,82 4,08 3,68 5,08 5,29 4,87
R2 0,0152 0,0151 0,0156 0,0232 0,0234 0,0235 0,0033 0,0035 0,0033 0,0043 0,0045 0,0044
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level  32 





Tangible 4.84934 *** -0.9841 ***
1.06187 0.1074
Age  -0.94984 *** -0.2950
0.34553 0.0340 ***
Size (Log total assets) -1.20606 *** -0.00706
0.21573 0.0209
Intercept 81.69223 *** -0.1702
2.92766 0.2842









Prob of Family =0
Estimation Method: Logit
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level  33 
 




Non Family 1,3121 *** 1,629 ***
0,0264 0,037
Family ownership -0,0317 *** -0,034 ***
0,0010 0,001
Size (Log total asset) -0,0263 *** 0,0153 *** -0,021 *** 0,024 ***
0,0016 0,0009 0,002 0,001
Age -0,0025 *** 0,0008 *** -0,003 *** 0,001 ***
0,0001 0,0001 0,000 0,000
ROE 0,1120 *** 0,0756 *** 0,158 *** 0,110 ***
0,0043 0,0043 0,006 0,006
Financial solvency score -0,0014 *** -0,0008 *** -0,003 *** -0,002 ***
0,0002 0,0002 0,000 0,000
Bank leverage 0,0072 *** 0,0086 *** 0,011 *** 0,013 ***
0,0008 0,0008 0,001 0,001
Intercept 2,5010 *** -0,4223 *** 2,625 *** -0,589 ***
0,0845 0,0139 0,119 0,020
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22237 22237 22237 22237
F statistics 220,88 307,16 185,4 261,94
R2 0,1659 0,2166 0,143 0,1908
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